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Upon arrival in Texas, some of the cargo
was damaged. Thyssen and other plain
tiffs brought an action against the M/V
Kava Yerakas, Dodekaton and Eurolines
for cargo damage occurring during tran
sit. The district court entered judgment in
favor of vessel owner Dodekaton. The
other defendants settled and plaintiffs ap
pealed the judgment in favor of Dodeka
ton.
Under COG SA, a cargo owner may only
recover from the carrier of the goods. Pa
cific Employers Ins. Co. v. MIV Gloria
767 F.2d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 1 985). A
"carrier" is "the owner or the charterer
who enters into a contract of carriage with
a shipper." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 l (a). A
"contract of carriage" takes the form of a
bill of lading or other similar document of
title. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 l (b). A con
tract of carriage with a vessel owner may
be directly between the parties or through
the charterer's authority to sign bills of
lading "for the master." Pacific Employ
ers, 767 F.2d at 236. If, however, the
charterer signs without the authority of
the vessel owner, then the owner will not
be a party to the contract of carriage and
will not be a "carrier" under COGSA.
Pacific Employers, 767 F.2d at 237; J.
Gerber & Co. v. MIV Inagua Tania, 828
F.Supp. 458, 460 (S.D. Tex. 1 992). To
establish liability for the vessel owner
the cargo owner must show that th;
shipowner was a party to the contract·
failure to do so will show that the carg�
owner did not rely on the owner to per
form the contract.
The district court did not confront the
contention that Eurolines, the charterer,
had power to sign bills of lading on be
half of Dodekaton based on charter party
provisions nearly indistinguishable from
those contained in the Pacific Employers
case. In Pacific Employers, the fifth cir
cuit found that charter party provisions
largely identical to Clause 8 and 45 of the
Thyssen charter party entitled the char
terer to sign bills of lading on behalf of
the vessel owner. Pacific Employers, 767
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F.2d at 237-38. However, the major de
parture from the Pacific Employers'
charter versus that of Thyssen is that the
latter charter contained an in
demnification provision, making the
case more factually similar to a case in
the fourth circuit, Yeramex Interna
tional v. S.S. Tendo, 595 F.2d 943 (4th
Cir. 1 979). The fifth circuit considered
the Yeramex case in its analysis when
examining the effect of the indemnity
clause.
A provision in a contract of carriaae
that purports to relieve a party of liabii
ity is expressly void under the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act. See 46 U.S.C.
app. § 1 303(8). In the Yeramex case the
fourth circuit did not allow a much more
elaborate indemnity provision by itself
alone to exonerate the vessel owner
from traditional responsibilities for ves
sel seaworthiness, etc. The fifth circuit
circuit agreed with this concept, decid
ing that the indemnity provision did not
have a bearing on the owner's liability
as a COGSA carrier.
In sum, the fact that the parties had a
charter party and bill of lading nearly
identical to those found in Pacific Em
ployers was controlling. Clause 45 of
the Thyssen charter party entitled the
master to allow Eurolines' agent to sign
the bills of lading, binding the owner.
If, the court stated, on remand, the ship
pers proved that the master had actually
authorized Eurolines to sign on his be
half, then the Pacific Employers frame
work would be fulfilled, providing nec
essary privity with the vessel owner
thereby meeting the definition of
COGSA carrier.
In the absence of this proof, the court
held that the fifth circuit's standard for
COGSA liability required privity, re
jecting arguments by the plaintiffs hold
ing up second circuit cases where claims
were directly asserted against vessel
owners in privity's absence. A better
argument by Thyssen, which was enter
tained by the court, was the assertion
that the district court had erred in find
ing no common law bailment claim
against the vessel owner for cargo dam
age.
In the absence of COGSA
"carriage of goods," which is defined as
covering "the period from the time
when the goods are loaded on to the
time when they are discharged from the
ship," 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 1 (e), the

plaintiffs argued that Dodekaton was li
able under common law as a bailee of
cargo for damage caused by its own
negligence.
The fifth circuit, however, found that
plaintiff-appellants had not established
a primafacie bailment claim against the
owner. First, plaintiffs did not show
that an express or implied bailment con
tract existed. Second, the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the cargo was
within Dodekaton's exclusive posses
sion during transit. (The cargo was also
within Eurolines'- the charterer's
possession.) The appeals court af
firmed the district court, finding that,
even if a general maritime bailment
claim were permissible as a matter of
law, Dodekaton was not liable as a
bailee for cargo damage.
William Burkett
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Supplemental Rules
SECOND CIRCUIT RULES
COURTS CAN'T DENY
COUNTERSECURITY ON
ARBITRABLE ACTIONS
While trial courts have broad discre
tion when ordering countersecurity
in proceedings brought under Section
� of the Arbitration Act, arbitrability
IS not permissible basis for denying
countersecurity since the result
would conflict with clear purposes of
the Arbitration Act and Supplemen
tal Fed. R. Civ. P . E(7).
(Result Shipping Co. , Ltd. v. Ferruzzi
Trading USA, Inc. , CA2, 56 F.3d 394,
5125195)

Grain was shipped from the United
States to Jordan pursuant to a contract
between defendant Ferruzzi Trading
USA, Inc. (Ferruzzi) and the Jordanian
Ministry of Supply. Ferruzzi chartered
�e MIV Bulk Topaz from Result Ship
pmg Co., Ltd. (Result) in order to ship
the grain. The charter party between
Ferruzzi and Result provided that all
disputes arising out of the charter would
be subject to arbitration in London.
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When the vessel arrived in Jordan, the
Jordanian Ministry rejected the grain in
two of the vessel 's holds as damaged and
seized the MN Bulk Topaz. Result was
forced to post bond in order to secure the
vessel " s release and commenced suit
against Ferruzzi by attaching Ferruzzi's
property in the District of Connecticut to
secure an in personam admiralty claim
for breach of the charter party. The prop
erty consisted primarily of a $66,000
mortgage on residential property owned
by two Ferruzzi employees.
Result
claimed total damages of $ 1 ,082, 1 39.30.
Ferruzzi answered by filing a counter
claim, alleging that the crew of the MN
Bulk Topaz was responsible for damaging
the grain after it had been loaded onto the
vessel, and that Result was therefore li
able to Ferruzzi for damages totalling
$3 75,000. Ferruzzi moved for security
for its costs in connection with Result's
attachment of its property, and for coun
tersecurity on its counterclaim. The dis
trict court denied both motions and
granted Result' s motion to stay the pro
ceedings pending arbitration on the mer
its in London.
Ferruzzi appealed the order denying its
motion for security and countersecurity,
arguing, inter alia, that the district court
denied its motion for security and coun
tersecurity solely because the underlying
dispute was to be resolved in arbitration.
Because this case presented "issues
concerning the interplay of the
Arbitration Act, * * * and the Supple
mental Rules governing availability of
security and countersecurity," Result
Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Ferruzzi Trading
USA, Inc., 56 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir.
1 995), which had not been previously
addressed in the second circuit, the ap
peals court exercised its j urisdiction to
hear the appeal under the collateral order
doctrine. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 3 3 7 U.S. 54 1 , 547-47, 69
S.Ct. 1 221, 1 225, 93 L.Ed. 1 528 ( 1 949).
The issue in the case was whether or not
the court, in the exercise of its dis
cretionary power to order countersecu
rity, could deny such security to a de
fendant because the action giving rise to
the counterclaim was subject to contrac-
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tually stipulated arbitration.
While acknowledging that the trial
court has broad discretionary powers
with respect to ordering countersecurity
in proceedings brought pursuant to § 8
of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 8
( 1 988), the court of appeals held that
denying countersecurity solely because
the underlying dispute was to be re
solved in arbitration would conflict with
the clear purposes of the Act and Sup
plemental Rule E(7) of Fed. R. Civ. P.
Section 8 allows an "aggrieved party" to
enjoy the advantages of both arbitration
and traditional maritime security devices,
and a counterclaiming defendant is an
"aggrieved party" within the meaning of
the statute who is as entitled to both these
remedies as is the plaintiff. • • • [T)he
purpose of Rule E(7) is to equalize, where
not otherwise inequitable, the positions of
the plaintiff and the defendant with re
spect to security. A plaintiff may not be
denied an order of attachment merely be
cause the parties' dispute is to be resolved
in arbitration.* * • [S)uch arbitration is
not a permissible basis on which to deny
the defendant the benefit of traditional
maritime security devices, such as coun
tersecurity under Rule E(7).

Rule E(7) because the act of the wrong
ful attachment would not have arisen
"out of the same transaction or occur
rence with respect to which the action
was originally filed." 56 F.3d at 402.
Christopher M. Walker
Class of 1997

0

0

0
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BAREBOAT CH ARTERER H ELD
LIABLE IN SEP ARATE IN
PERSONAM ACTION ON FACTS
OF P RIOR IN REM SUIT
Admiral ty co urts presi ding o ver in
rem actio ns may award damages i n

ex cess o f the val ue o f the res; b are
bo at charterer coll aterall y esto pped
f ro m rel iti gati ng damages and li abil 
i ty q uestio ns in subseq uent sui t, al
tho ugh prio r in rem actio n hel d no t
res judicata o n separate in personam
cl aim agai nst charterer.
(Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.

56 F.3d at 400. (Emphases in original.)

v. Empresa Naviera Santa S. A. , CA2,

Because the record of the proceedings
in the district court was unclear as to the
judge's basis for denying Ferruzzi's
motion for countersecurity, the court of
appeals remanded "in order to allow the
District Judge to exercise his discretion
without reference to the impermissible
consideration of arbitration." /d. at 40 1 .
As to Ferruzzi's motion for security
for its costs in connection with Result's
attachment of its property, including le
gal fees, the court of appeals upheld the
district court's denial of the motion and
noted that Ferruzzi had "pointed to no
federal statute authorizing awards of at
torney' s fees to a prevailing defendant
in a maritime case merely because the
litigation was initiated by attachment."
/d. In a footnote, the court, relying on

On January 1 6, 1 988, the MN Luna
(the Vessel) dragged an anchor
in the Hudson River, damaging an elec
trical cable pipeline owned by Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation
(Central Hudson). The Vessel was op
erated by Empresa Naviera Santa S.A.
(Empresa) pursuant to a bareboat char
ter party. Central Hudson thereafter
commenced an action in the Southern
District of New York against the Vessel
in rem and in personam against the reg
istered owner, Seiriki One (Panama)
S.A. (Seiriki). A $3 million letter of un
dertaking which did not expressly in
clude any charterparties was delivered
to Central Hudson by the Vessel's un
derwriters on behalf of Seiriki. Seiriki

56 F.3d 359, 5117195)

mar II

Incas & Monterey Printing & Packag
ing, Ltd. v. MIV Sang Jin, 747 F.2d 958,
965, 965 n. 1 9 (5th Cir. 1 984), cert. de
nied, 4 7 1 U.S. 1 1 1 7, 1 05 S.Ct. 236 1 , 86
L.Ed.2d 261 ( 1 985), stated further that
even had Ferruzzi based its counter
claim on wrongful attachment, counter
security would not be mandatory under
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